忘却からの帰還〜Atomic Age

Any history of Hiroshima revisionism must acknowledge Gar Alperovitz as its most influential champion. Although earlier writers such as William Appleman Williams and D. F. Fleming had echoed British scientist P. M. S. Blackett's charge that atomic bombs were used primarily to make the Soviet Union “more manageable”rather than to defeat an already- defeated Japan, they had provided little in the way of documentary evidence. Alperovitz's 1965 book, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet power, caused a sensation. Here was an entire volume devoted to the subject, weighed down with academic paraphernalia (some chapters had more than two hundred footnotes), which appeared to be the model of academic research. One admirer called it, “A daring and elaborate work of historical reconstruction,” and another wrote that Atomic Diplomacy “made it difficult for conscientious scholars any longer to avoid the challenge of revisionist historians.”The truth is that the book was a travesty of scholarship. In it and in his subsequent writing, Alperovitz had employed the crudest devices to make the evidence appear to support his theses.

広島歴史修正主義の歴史を語るには、最も影響力の大きいGar Alperovitzに触れておかなければならない。「日本を打ち負かすより、ソ連を扱いやすくすることが、原爆使用の主目的だった」という英国の科学者PMS Blackettの告発をなぞったWilliam Appleman WilliamsやD. F. Flemingといった初期の執筆者たちは、証拠書類をほとんど提示しなかった。Alperovitzの1965年の本「Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet power」はセンセーションを起こした。本一冊すべてをこの話題に費やし、学術的道具立て（ある章は200以上の注記があった）を使って気をめいらせ、学術調査のモデルのように見せかけていた。ある称賛者は「大胆かつ詳細な歴史の再構築の労作」と呼び、ある称賛者は「Atomic Diplomacyは、実直な歴史家が、歴史修正主義の歴史家の異議申し立てを無視できないものにした」と評した。実際のところは、この本はまがいものの学術研究だった。この本と続けて書かれた本で、Alperovitzは、証拠が自分の論を支持しているように見せかけるために、もっとも下品な手段を使った。

The most salient feature of Alperovitz's work has been his unscholarly use of ellipses. Whereas most writers employ these to spare the reader extraneous phrases, Alperovitz uses them as tactical weapons to render documents more suitable for his purposes. Soon after the surrender of Germany in May 1945, for instance, President Truman agreed to a curtailment of Lend-Lease supplies for the Soviet Union to those that could be used in the war against Japan (the Soviets were neutral at the time, but had pledged to enter the Pacific War after Germany's defeat). Alperovitz in Atomic Diplomacy professed to see this as an example of Truman's wish to use economic coercion against the Soviets at a time when an atomic device had yet to be tested. Unable to find any evidence to support the allegation, he created some. In his discussion of alleged debates over using the curtailment as leverage against the Soviets, Alperovitz had the then ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, arguing that the United States “should retain current control of . . . credits in order to be in a position to protect American vital interests in the formulative period immediately following the war.'” A look at the source for this claim, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal's diary, reveals that Harriman's statement referred to postwar dollar credits and had nothing at all to do with Lend Lease. Alperovitz's omission of the word these ("these credits") helped to make his misuse of Harriman's words more plausible.

Alperovitzの著作の最も際立った特徴は、学問的でない省略の使用だった。大半の執筆者は省略を無関係なフレーズの割愛に使う。しかし、Alperovitzは自分の目的に合うように文書を見せ掛けるための戦術兵器として使った。1945年5月のドイツの降伏のすぐ後に、トルーマン大統領は、日本に対する戦争（ソ連はこの時点では中立だったが、ドイツ降伏後に太平洋戦争に参戦することを約束していた）に使われたであろう、ソ連への軍事物資の貸与の削減に同意した。Alperovitzは「Atomic Diplomacy」で、これを、原子爆弾の実験の実施前に、ソ連に対する経済的強制力を使うトルーマンの意志の例であると見せかけた。この主張を支持する証拠を見つけられないので、彼は証拠を創った。ソ連に対する影響力として軍事物資貸与の削減を使ったことに対する疑わしい議論で、Alperovitzは、駐ソ米国大使Wアヴェレル・ハリマンが「戦後直後の期間の米国の重大な国益を守る立場をとるために、.... クレジットの現在のコントロールを維持すべきである」と論じたと書いた。この主張の出典である、海軍長官ジェームズ・フォレスタルの日記を見ると、ハリマンの記述は、戦後のドルクレジットについて言っていて、軍事物資貸与とは何の関係もない。Alperovitzの「これら」（これらのクレジット）という単語の省略は、ハリマンの記述の誤用をもっともらしく見せるのに役立っている。

[ Robert James Maddox: "Gar Alperovitz -- Godfather of Hiroshima Reisionism" in "Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism" edited by Robert James Maddox, pp.7-8, 2007 ]

Forrestal entered another Harriman telegram discussing Russian infiltration in Brazil, and still another, dated April 11, on the question of dollar credits for the Kremlin. Harriman described the "enormous plans" for Russian industrial expansion, intended to triple steel production capacity and to run apparently for fifteen or twenty years, Harriman estimated that Russians probably wanter about $6 billion in credit from the United States to make a start on these vast projects, but the dropped the question as to whether "our basic interest might better be served by increasing our trade with other parts of the warold rather than giving preference to the Soviet Union as as source of supply." He thought also that we should consider the conservation of our own natural resources. at all event, "our experience has incontrovertibly proved that it is not possible to bank general good will in Moscow and I agree with the Department that we should retain current control of thses credits in order to be in a position to protect American vital interests in the formulative period immediately following the war."

[ The Forrestal Diaries ]

It now was obvious that the showdown strategy failed. Faced with a setback, Truman's advisers decided it was necessary to further emphasize and dramatize American determination. As early as April 11, Ambassador Harriman and the Department of State were in agreement that the United States "should retain current control of . . . credits [to the Russians] in order to be in a position to protect American vital interests in the formulative period immediately following the war."

[ Gar Alperovitz: "Atomic Diplomacy" (1965) ]